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ABSTRACT The orchestration of cloud computing with wireless sensor network (WSN), termed as
sensor-cloud, has recently gained remarkable attention from both academia and industry. It enhances the
processing and storage capabilities of the resources-constrained sensor networks in various applications
such as healthcare, habitat monitoring, battlefield surveillance, disaster management, etc. The diverse nature
of sensor network applications processing and storage limitations on the sensor networks, which can be
overcome through integrating them with the cloud paradigm. Sensor-cloud offers numerous benefits such
as flexibility, scalability, collaboration, automation, virtualization with enhanced processing and storage
capabilities. However, these networks suffer from limited bandwidth, resource optimization, reliability, load
balancing, latency , and security threats. Therefore, it is essential to secure the sensor-cloud architecture
from various security attacks to preserve its integrity. The main components of the sensor-cloud architecture
which can be attacked are: (i) the sensor nodes; (ii) the communication medium; and (iii) the remote cloud
architecture. Although security issues of these components are extensively studied in the existing literature;
however, a detailed analysis of various security attacks on the sensor-cloud architecture is still required. The
main objective of this research is to present state-of-the-art literature in the context of security issues of the
sensor-cloud architecture along with their preventive measures. Moreover, several taxonomies of the security
attacks from the sensor-cloud’s architectural perspective and their innovative solutions are also provided.
INDEX TERMS Sensor-cloud architecture, security, wireless sensor networks, Internet of Things.
I. INTRODUCTION
A wireless sensor network consists of a large number
of miniature sensor nodes that capture a large amount
of data from the sensing field. Forwarding such a large
amount of raw data across the network exposes them to a
plethora of challenges such as low quality of service (QoS),
i.e., latency, congestion, throughput, and security in these
resource-constrained networks. They have limited memory,
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
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processing, communication, and most importantly, limited
irreplaceable source of energy supply. To overcome the afore-
mentioned limitations, the wireless network is integrated
with cloud computing forming a new computing paradigm
known as sensor-cloud. Sensor-cloud can be defined as an
infrastructure that allows truly pervasive computation using
sensors as an interface between the physical and the cyber
world and the Internet as the communicationmedium [1]–[3].
Sensor-cloud overcomes various limitations of the sensor
networks as well as enhancing the lifetime of the network.
In the sensor-cloud, most of the resources-intensive tasks
89344 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ VOLUME 9, 2021
R. Alturki et al.: Sensor-Cloud Architecture: Taxonomy of Security Issues
FIGURE 1. Applications of wireless sensor networks.
such as processing, storage, and data aggregation are trans-
ferred from the resource-constrained sensor networks to the
cloud architecture [4].
This improves QoS, enhances network lifetime, and facil-
itates users to gather, store, access, process, visualize and
analyze a large amount of sensory data easily using enriched
cloud computing resources. Currently, WSNs are being uti-
lized in several areas like healthcare, defence such as military
target tracking and surveillance [5], [6], government and envi-
ronmental services like natural disaster relief [7], hazardous
environment exploration [8], [9], and seismic sensing [10],
as depicted in Figure. 1, where data captured by the sensors
is forwarded to the cloud infrastructure for further processing.
Although, sensor-cloud offer many advantages such as
flexibility, scalability, collaboration, automation virtualiza-
tion with enhanced processing and storage capabilities, and
so forth. However, at the same time suffer from various
limitations, such as resource scheduling, Quality of Service,
load balancing, and most importantly, security and privacy
[11]–[14]. A lot of work has been done to address these
issues. However, research on the security, privacy, and trust
in the sensor-cloud architecture is limited in the relevant
literature. According to [15], 49 % of the businesses are
delaying the deployment of the sensor-cloud due to security
concerns. Thus, security remains a key concern hindering the
widespread adoption of the sensor-cloud.
The main components of the sensor-cloud are sensors,
communication medium, and cloud architecture, where each
component is responsible for a specific task. For instance,
secure pre-processing (deployment of sensors in the sensing
field) performing smart sensing and data processing. The
communication channel acts as a bridge between the sensors
and the cloud architecture, facilitating secure data communi-
FIGURE 2. Sensor-cloud architecture.
cation. Finally, the cloud’s secure runtime services are pro-
vided in the sensor-cloud architecture, as shown in Figure. 2.
Despite the importance of these components, they suffer
from various security threats [16]–[19]. This paper aims to
present a comprehensive review of various security attacks on
these individual components and their countermeasures. It is
imperative to protect and secure this architecture vertically
from the bottom, i.e., the sensor node to the communica-
tion channel. Finally, the cloud of the sensor-cloud archi-
tecture. Although a lot of work is available that investigates
each component of this architecture’s security issues, none
of them study security attacks from the perspective of the
sensor-cloud architecture with their countermeasures. The
main objectives of our research conducted in this paper, are
as follows:
1) the importance of security study in the sensor-cloud
architecture;
2) sate-of-the-art security and privacy in the sensor-cloud
architecture;
3) a taxonomy of security attacks and their countermea-
sures from the architectural perspective;
4) security attacks on the sensor node, wireless commu-
nication channel, and the cloud architecture and their
countermeasures; and
5) research challenges ahead.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we discuss the importance of security in the sensor-cloud
platforms; and various reasons for carrying out this research
work. In Section III, a detailed overview of the literature is
provided, along with highlighting the novelty and contribu-
tions of our paper. Next, we discuss various security attacks
and their countermeasures from an architectural perspective,
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i.e., on the sensors, on the communication channel, and the
cloud architecture in Section IV. Similarly, Section V provide
a brief discussion on various innovative solutions for tackling
security challenges discussed previously. Finally, limitations
and future research directions are highlighted in Section VI.
II. MOTIVATION
Recently, the sensor-cloud architecture becomes very popular
due to its virtual nature. It facilitates efficient and real-time
information sharing among multiple users, dynamic resource
management, which, in turn, increases resource utilization.
It also enhances the storage and processing capabilities of the
traditional sensor network. All these features make this multi-
user, multi-applications environment a suitable choice for the
real-time decision support system. However, the distributed
and virtual nature of the sensor-cloud and a diverse range of
stockholders expose this architecture to various challenges.
A lot of research work is available in the literature that stud-
ies sensor-cloud from various perspectives to address these
challenges. However, most of them considered security of the
individual component in case of security and are thus limited
in their scope. This paper extends the previouswork presented
in [2]. The proposed work presents a novel sensor-cloud
architecture, defining its various components and their rela-
tionships. It divides the sensor-cloud architecture vertically
into three layers, i.e., sensor-centric, middleware, and client-
centric. However, this work lacks security issues facing the
overall architecture. This survey enhances previous research
work by considering emerging security and privacy issues
from the architectural perspective from the lower to the higher
layers, i.e., sensors, the communication channel, and the
cloud architecture, to fill the gap that exists in the current
literature [20], [21].
III. RELATED WORK
The orchestration between the sensors and the cloud architec-
ture with the help of a communication network, also known
as sensor-cloud gain momentum in recent years. As stated
earlier, the main components of the sensor-cloud are; sensors,
the communication medium, and cloud computing. A lot of
research work is conducted recently that explores the security
issues of each component of this architecture. For instance
Wireless sensor networks and security [22]–[29], Secure data
communication [30]–[33], and cloud computing and secu-
rity [34]–[41]. Security in the wireless sensor network is
extensively studied. In this regard, the authors in [22], [42]
present various security threats and vulnerabilities that occur
at various layers of the sensor networks. Moreover, a detailed
survey of various security attacks is investigated, and their
countermeasures are provided from the latest research. More-
over, the authors also provided a detailed survey of data
aggregation techniques and energy-efficient routing proto-
cols. Finally, emerging security issues are also discussed.
Similarly, the authors in [23], [43] explore various security
issues in the WSN such as IEEE 802.15.4, Berkeley media
access control for low-power sensor networks, IPv6 over
low-power wireless personal area networks, routing proto-
cols for low-power and lossy networks (RPL), back pressure
collection protocol, collection tree protocols, and constrained
application protocol for WSN. Moreover, their countermea-
sures are also provided in this paper. Furthermore, future
research directions are also provided at the network layer in
order to protect it against various security attacks [44]–[46].
Likewise, the major security aspects of WSNs are outlined
in [28]. They classify security attacks as well as their counter-
measures. The paper delineates various research challenges
and outlines future research directions in this specific domain.
Moreover, security attacks such as physical attacks, good
and bad-mouthing attacks, and on-off attacks related to the
networking layer of the WSN, along with privacy, secrecy,
and authentication, are explored in detail in [25], [47], [48].
Another similar work that study routing layer attacks for
a better understanding of intrusion detection system in the
sensor networks is presented in [26]. Their investigation is
based on the analysis of information gathered both from the
Sink and victim node. The degree of attack in these networks
depends on factors such topology of WSN and the distance
from the Sink. Furthermore, the work in [27] investigates the
security of the sensor networks in awide range of applications
and scenarios. Moreover, a comprehensive discussion on the
current and future security issues in these diverse applications
is also provided in this paper.
Similarly, a lot of research work is proposed in the lit-
erature that studies security in cloud architecture. In [34],
[49], the authors mainly focus on four types of attacks. They
are; network-based attacks, VM-based attacks, storage-based
attacks, and application-based attacks. Moreover, various
countermeasures of these attacks are also provided. Further-
more, novel, innovative, and promising security solutions
by modifying the system’s configuration are also presented.
Similarly, the authors in [35] present a parametric comparison
of threats faced by the cloud platform along with possible
solutions from the literature. Moreover, various intrusion
detection mechanisms are also considered, along with future
research directions. Likewise, [36] explore various threats
faced by the cloud architecture. It devises a threat iden-
tification mechanism that systematically identifies poten-
tial threats using the Microsoft STRIDE threat modeling
approach in a cloud computing architecture. Another paper
studying privacy and security in the cloud architecture is pre-
sented in [38]. Moreover, it provides updated and latest prac-
tices tackling and avoiding these attacks. It identifies 28 cloud
security threats and grouped them into five categories and a
detailed discussion by considering up to nine attacks on this
architecture. Finally, the paper concludes with limitations and
future research directions for further exploration. Similarly,
in [40] the authors provide a brief overview on various cloud
components, their security issues, risks, along with emerging
solutions that may potentially mitigate the vulnerabilities in
this architecture. The authors stress that more work to be done
to secure the cloud architecture to make it a mature platform
for the larger interest of stakeholders.
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Another landmark work that identifies security and privacy
issues in the cloud architecture along with the latest solutions
and their limitations is presented in [41], [50]. Moreover,
future research directions are also provided. Finally, a tax-
onomy of the security attacks that threaten various services
and their mitigating solutions on the cloud architecture is
provided in [51]. It also provides various open issues and pro-
poses future research directions, particularly from different
stakeholders’ perspectives, i.e., cloud service providers, data
owners, and cloud users.
Apart from the research work that focuses on either edge
of the network, the communication channel, or the cloud
architecture, some research work is targeting various per-
spectives of the sensor-cloud architecture. These include
concept and architecture [1], and the concept of physical
sensors and services virtualization [52]. A detailed discus-
sion on semantically rich service-oriented architecture (SOA)
is presented in [53]. Moreover, a theoretical model of the
sensor-cloud is presented in [54] and is also validated math-
ematically. In [2] the authors present an architecture for
sensor-cloud which define various components of the proto-
col stack and their relationship with both the physical sen-
sors and users. Apart from this sensor-cloud is studied from
various application perspectives such as, patient data privacy
and security in smart health care [55], smart data collection
in the sensor-cloud [56]–[59], secure Communication [60],
[61], and secure data collection in the sensor-cloud architec-
ture [62]. All these techniques are summarized in the tabular
form in the Table. 1.
IV. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES IN THE
SENSOR-CLOUD
The sensor-cloud is a computing paradigm, which facilitates
resource sharing and provides a platform to integrate dif-
ferent sensor networks. In these networks, multiple users
can build their sensing applications simultaneously without
worrying about the traditional limitations of the sensor net-
work. It enables a multi-user on-demand sensory system,
where computing, sensing, and network resources are shared
among multiple users and applications. Despite the benefits
of sensor-clouds, the security issue is open mainly because
the masses can access this infrastructure for different pur-
poses. Therefore, it has the inherent challenge of lacking
security and privacy issues across the sensor-cloud infras-
tructure. Although new threats are emerging in this architec-
ture, However, the existing security solutions of stand-alone
sensor networks or cloud architecture are infeasible for
the sensor-cloud architecture, requiring innovative solutions.
Based on the unique security challenges discussed above,
in this section, we present a taxonomy of cybersecurity
attacks along with their countermeasures on the three com-
ponents of the sensor-cloud architecture, which are; sensors,
the communication channel, and the cloud framework (as
shown in Figure 3). These aspects and additional details are
further described in the following subsections.
1) secure the sensor node
2) secure communication or wireless channel
• secure data collection at the sensor node
• secure data transmission on the communication
or wireless channel
3) secure data at the cloud platform
A. SECURE THE SENSOR NODE
A sensor node can either be physically secured or through
the use of authorization and authentication techniques. In the
former one, access control mechanisms restrict remote access
to the geographical area where sensor nodes are deployed
(physical). In the latter one (logical), various authentication
techniques are used to authorize and give access only to
appropriate and authorized users, or other nodes to these
sensors [63]. Moreover, communication between sensors can
also be secured using certain security protocols.
B. SECURE THE COMMUNICATION CHANNEL
Security of the communication channel can be divided into
two different types: (i) attacks and countermeasures during
data collection at the sensor node; and (ii) attacks and coun-
termeasures during secure data transmission on the wireless
channel.
1) ATTACKS AND COUNTERMEASURES DURING DATA
COLLECTION AT THE SENSOR NODE
1) device tempering attacks
2) eavesdropping
3) jamming attacks
4) denial of service (DoS) attacks
a: DEVICE TAMPERING ATTACKS
In the device tampering attacks, the real node is modified
into a fake node in such a way that facilitates the attackers to
access sensitive and confidential information passing through
it or stored within the buffer of the node. Device tamper-
ing attacks also result in selective message eavesdropping
attacks, which act as a base for launching other serious secu-
rity attacks such as wormhole and black-hole attacks. The
device tempering attacks can be avoided using various tem-
pering proof techniques [66]–[68] proposed in the literature
however require additional energy and processing costs.
b: JAMMING ATTACKS
In jamming attacks, the perpetrator tries to interrupt the nor-
mal operation of the sensor nodes as well as of the network
using a strong jamming source. The jamming source trans-
mits radio signals using the same frequency as the sensor
network. It thus adversely affects the communication among
various entities of a sensor network. As a result, there is no
exchange of messages in the network due to such interfer-
ence by the attackers [69], [70]. Depends on the jamming
source, it may either be strong or weak [63], [71]. In the
case of a strong jamming source, it can affect all activities
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TABLE 1. Summary of the state-of-the-art related works in the field of secure IoT, cloud computing, fog architecture, and physical sensor devices.
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FIGURE 3. Taxonomy of cybersecurity attacks on the three components of the sensor-cloud architecture.
of a network, while a weak source can affect only a portion
of the network reachable by the attackers. Jamming attacks
can be avoided using Frequency hopping techniques. How-
ever, due to high processing and memory requirements, these
techniques are unsuitable for the resource-constrained sensor
nodes. The Ultra Wide Band (UWB) transmission techniques
are considered an alternative solution for protecting these
resource-constrained networks from jamming attacks. How-
ever, they are not as effective as the frequency hopping tech-
nique against the jamming attacks [46]. Frequency hopping
can be considered as one of the mechanisms for preventing
this kind of attack.
c: DoS ATTACKS
During these attacks, all available resources are exhausted by
the attacker node. The attacker monopolized all resources so
that the legitimate users are denied access to the resources,
applications, and services offered by the network. During
these attacks, the attackers act as a normal node and challenge
the power and authority of the network, disturbing the smooth
operation of the network. Moreover, it weakens the network
capacity, and capabilities of offering various services to its
sub-entities [72], [73].
2) ATTACKS AND COUNTERMEASURES DURING SECURE
DATA TRANSMISSION ON THE WIRELESS CHANNEL
1) false routing
2) packet replication
3) man in the middle attacks
4) black hole attacks
5) sink hole attacks
6) worm hole attacks
7) selective packet forwarding
8) spoofed routing information
9) acknowledgement spoofing
10) node replication attacks
11) passive information gathering
12) sybil attacks
a: FALSE ROUTING
In this type of attack, the perpetrator targets the rout-
ing table by injecting incorrect routing information. It is
flooded with imprecise information, causing routing table
overflow [74], [75]. Moreover, in some instances, the mali-
cious node change and re-routes the packet on a route other
than the one for it is expected before transmitting it across the
network [76]–[79].
b: PACKET REPLICATION
WSN has limited resources, i.e., energy, bandwidth pro-
cessing, and communication. In packet replication attacks,
the attackers aim to exploit the resource-constrained nature
of these sensor nodes. During these attacks, the attackers
replicate the received packets and then forward them to other
nodes. This causes flooding attacks in the network that causes
network congestion and deteriorates the performance of the
network. Moreover, the energy of the network is depleted
earlier than expected, which shortens the lifetime of the net-
work [16].
c: BLACK HOLE
Another category of attacks that target routing tables are black
hole attacks. During these attacks, the malicious node act as
a black hole. All or some of the network traffic is re-routed
towards the malicious node, which accepts all incoming net-
work traffic and refuses to further forward it towards the other
nodes or their final destination. As a result, data communica-
tion in the network is adversely disrupted deteriorating the
performance of the network [63], [80].
d: SINKHOLE ATTACKS
Likewise, in sinkhole attacks, the attackers redirect all the net-
work traffic towards a specific malicious node due to the false
routing information advertised by the compromised node. All
nodes in the network follow this incorrect information and
thus, nodes in the network are tricked by diverting their traffic
towards amalicious route. As a result, data reach a destination
other than the desired one. The sinkhole attacks result in
selective forwarding attacks because all the network traffic
is attracted towards a single point.
e: WORMHOLE ATTACKS
In a wormhole attack, a packet is captured at one location
while forwarded from the other allocation using tunnelling
technique. The same packet then starts its transmission back
into the network from its new location. This type of attack
involves two types of competing adversaries. The worm
whole attacks may lead to false/forged routing information,
change of network topology as well as causing packet loss.
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f: SELECTIVE MESSAGE FORWARDING
The attacker nodes keep some selected messages during
these attacks while the others are transmitted across the
network. Thus, a set of selected messages are dropped
and are never forwarded. They are considered lost, which
compromises the reliability and integrity of the underlying
application. The attacker or the compromised node is usu-
ally between the sender and receiver node monitoring the
flow of traffic between them. In the black hole attacks,
on the other hand, all packets are dropped by the attacker
node.
g: SPOOFING ATTACKS
In spoofing attacks, the attacker pretended to be a legitimate
user and launch various attacks. They fabricate their iden-
tity by using the credentials of the real users. These attacks
disrupt network traffic by altering the routing informa-
tion, creating routing loops, generating false error messages,
increasing end-to-end delays, and modifying the routing
information that adversely disrupts the flow of traffic in
the network. There are many variants of spoofing attacks
such as acknowledgment spoofing and IP spoofing. In the
former case, an acknowledgment is spoofed by providing
false information to the sender about the receiver node, for
instance, sending information that a node is alive when in
fact, it is dead. In IP spoofing, the attacker uses a forged IP
address to hide the identity that facilitates them to exploit
the network and launch various attacks in the network. Dur-
ing IP hijacking, the attackers take over the IP addresses
of the legitimate users. These may result in congestion,
complete disconnection of either the network or users or
both from the network that completely paralyzes the net-
work. Moreover, the attackers get unauthorized access to
the network and take full control over the sensitive and
confidential data stored in these networks. The attackers
impersonate to be a trusted e-mail sender resulting in the
spread of malware by spoofing the meta-data. Other vari-
ants of spoofing attacks are DNS spoofing, ARP spoofing,
and so on.
h: NODE REPLICATION ATTACKS
In node replication attacks, the attackers implant a malicious
node using the ID of the existing nodes. These attacks dis-
rupt the network’s performance by providing wrong routing
information that re-routes the packets on the routes other
than the one on which it is expected. Moreover, inaccurate
information is forwarded from both the victim and attacker
nodes towards the decision center that adversely affects the
data analysis and decision-making process. Another issue
is the copying of the cryptographic keys from the victim
network that facilitate attackers to access and comprise the
security and privacy of the network and enable them to launch
various security attacks on the network. Node replication
attacks can be detected by verifying the nodes’ identities by
some trustworthy nodes/techniques.
i: PASSIVE INFORMATION GATHERING
In passive information gathering, the attackers usually gather
information and the data streams from both the node and the
network with the help of powerful antennas and receivers.
Along with various information, the attackers intercept the
sensor node’s location, locate the node in the network, and
understand the messages transmitting in the network. After
locating the node, the attacker can launch various attacks,
including damage to the sensor node, implanting malicious
nodes, analyse various contents of the packets such as mes-
sage IDs and timestamps to gain a deeper knowledge of the
network.
j: SYBIL ATTACK
A sensor network consist of sensor nodes that work collec-
tively to accomplish a task. In a Sybil attack, a malicious
node acts as a group of nodes using the identity of the
real nodes simultaneously that affect the overall operation
of the network. Few of the issues that arise as a result of
Sybil attacks are distributed storage, imprecise location of
the node, and incorrect routing information. The WSN can
be protected from the Sybil attack by verifying the identity
of the nodes. However, the challenging issue is that nodes are
resource-constrained, and thus, traditional algorithms are not
applicable in these networks. Therefore, light-weight security
solutions should be designed to secure the nodes from such
security attacks in the future [63].
k: SMURF ATTACK
In these attacks, a large number of the ICMP requests
are forwarded towards the victim node. In response to
these requests, the victim node sends back unlimited ICMP
responses that congest and paralyse the whole network. One
of the possible solutions to protect the network from such
attacks is to configure devices in the network such as routers
and individual computers that ignore constant ICMP requests.
C. SECURING DATA AT THE CLOUD PLATFORM
The three delivery models of the sensor-clouds proposed
by the NIST and consequently adopted by the industry are
Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS),
and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) [81], [82]. In this
section, we provide a detailed discussion on a diverse range
of security attacks targeting each of these components along
with their countermeasures [17], [83]–[85]. A taxonomy of
various attacks on three different cloud services, i.e., SaaS,
PaaS, and IaaS is given in Figure. 4. Since the cloud is usually
virtualized in terms of resource provisioning, VM security is
also considered.
1) SOFTWARE AS A SERVICE (SaaS)
In this model, the complete application package is hosted
at the cloud server. It is offered to an unlimited number of
individual clients as a service on demand. The client does
not require to host/save/configure the Software in advance
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FIGURE 4. Taxonomy of cybersecurity attacks on the three components of the cloud architecture.
FIGURE 5. Software as a service (SaaS) - services like Gmail, Google
app engine etc. are common SaaS cloud services.
on their system. This saves the client’s money and time [86].
Moreover, the cloud facilitates their clients with issues such
as Software licensing, availability of a diverse range of
software and an unlimited amount of available memory.
This is because the SaaS brings the data and business pro-
cesses together to utilize the services in a web service or
software-oriented architecture, as shown in Figure. 5. A brief
account of various security attacks on the SaaS platform is
provided below.
1) denial of service (DoS) attacks
2) distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks
3) SQL injection attacks
4) cross site scripting
a: DENIAL OF SERVICE (DoS) ATTACKS
In the DOS attack, the targeted system and resources are
flooded with an overwhelming number of requests that
adversely affect their normal operation. The attackers sent
a large number of unneeded packets that exceed the normal
capacity of both the network and, as well as, the server. These
attacks force either the network or the targeted system or both
so busy that they become unavailable and unable to serve
the legitimate users. DoS attacks may cause buffer overflow,
packet loss, congestion, and wastage of the useful resources
of the network [87], [88].
b: DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE (DDoS) ATTACKS
DDoS attacks pose a serious threat to both consumers and
vendors of the cloud. It can significantly damage the cus-
tomers’ data. In DDoS attacks, a large number of Internet
bots are deployed that attack a specific application, server,
or network with an overwhelming number of requests. As a
result, these networks are unable to serve legitimate users.
The affected server denies serving all authorized users [89].
To prevent this type of attack, cloud vendors should have a
comprehensive protection strategy that secures this infras-
tructure at all levels [90]. The comprehensive protection
strategy includes a denial-of-service response plan, secure
network infrastructure, and threat detection strategy. DDoS
attacks occur in various forms, and sometimes, it becomes
impossible to identify them. One of the possible identification
of these attacks is the dramatic decrease in the network’s per-
formance or an increase in the number of spam. When such
signs appear, the vulnerable device/issue must be addressed
at the earliest time [91], [92].
c: SQL INJECTION ATTACK
In SQL injection attacks, the perpetrators inject malicious
code that executes and modify SQL commands. These com-
mands even delete the rows, tables, or the entire tables and,
in some instances, the whole database.
d: AUTHENTICATION ATTACKS
In these attacks, the attackers try to steal the identity infor-
mation of the legitimate users they use for authentication.
The attackers use such information for accessing their pri-
vate information and confidential data either flowing through
or stored in the network. Authentication attacks can cause
other security attacks, such as bypass attacks, brute force
attacks, session eavesdropping, replay attacks, and key logger
attacks [93].
e: CROSS SITE SCRIPTING ATTACKS
These attacks usually target web-specific applications. The
perpetrator usually inserts some client-side scripts of the web
applications that aim to know the legitimate users’ credential.
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FIGURE 6. Platform as a service (PaaS) - services like online programming,
compilers, Google Colab etc. are common PaaS cloud services.
They then use such information for launching various security
attacks. The malicious script is automatically executed once
legitimate users visit various web applications.
2) PLATFORM AS A SERVICE (PaaS)
In this model, users are provided with some software and
development environments by the cloud providers [94]. This
offers greater scalability and manageability to the users.
These vendors have a greater choice and freedom and have
the opportunity to either use the existing or build their cus-
tomized applications that cater to their specific requirements.
Some examples of these applications are operating systems
with a stack of applications such as the LAMP platform
(Linux, PHP, and MySql), restricted J2EE, Ruby, and so on,
as depicted in Figure. 6. The payment mechanism of the PaaS
is a pay-per-use model. Few of the common security attacks
in the PaaS are presented below.
1) phishing attacks







In fishing attacks, the attackers usually try to access and
steal confidential information from legitimate users. It is one
of the major sources of identity theft and a favorite choice
of the attackers. In these attacks, the attackers usually send
an e-mail to the legitimate users asking for personal and
confidential information [95]. The users are tricked, and once
they respond to that e-mail. Their reply contains sensitive
information that is redirected and is forwarded towards the
attackers. As a result, the user becomes a victim of the
phishing attack. Moreover, opening such an e-mail can install
malware, damaging files, the overall system, and accessing
confidential information. The attackers can also abuse such
information particularly sensitive financial and personal con-
fidential information [96].
b: MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK
In this attack, the attacker tries to intercept the communi-
cation between the two parties, which might be VMs [86],
to know the information among them. In this way, the confi-
dential information among them has leaked that acts as a base
for launching other types of security attacks [63], [97].
c: CLOUD MALWARE-INJECTION ATTACKS
This attack modifies data and various functionalities of the
server by deteriorating their performance. Some of the most
common malware injection attacks are SQL injection and
cross-site scripting (XSS).
d: PASSWORD RESET
In the password reset, the perpetrator tries to urge the vic-
tim to sign up for an account for certain services under the
attacker’s control and is tricked for password resent. Some
of these services include free downloads, format conversion,
and so on. The attacker then uses this registration information
and enables them to access and then reset the password of the
victim’s multiple accounts on different systems.
e: PROGRAMMING FLAWS
The term flaw is used to describe a problem, weakness,
or even an error in a software program. It can pose a severe
security threat causing the Software to act abnormally or
crash in certain circumstances. These flaws act as the possible
entry point for the attackers to launch various security attacks.
The perpetrators gain complete control over the system and
access to confidential data. As a result, attackers can launch
various attacks causing unforeseen damage in terms of time
and cost. The organization developing Software must fix the
patches while the vendors consequently update them on their
computers [63].
f: APPLICATION SECURITY
WSNs are deployed in mission-critical applications. The col-
lected data is periodically transmitted to the sink node for fur-
ther processing. The sink node acts as a gateway facilitating
transferring of collected data towards the cloud. The attackers
usually target diverse applications launching various security
attacks such as overwhelm, repudiation, data corruption, and
malicious code. These attacks adversely affect the network’s
performance and consume limited energy and bandwidth of
the resources-constrained network. Indeed, securing the wire-
less sensor network is very important to secure confidential
data [98].
3) INFRASTRUCTURE AS A SERVICE (IaaS)
IaaS layer is designed to enhance the system’s performance
by providing clusters, grids, memory, and socialized systems,
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FIGURE 7. Infrastructure as a service (IaaS) - services like AWS EC2, VMs,
containers, Google’s cloud, etc., are common IaaS cloud services.
and application software to enhance their performance. Vari-
ous kinds of IaaS services are provided in the capacity of CPU
(servers/virtual machines), storage, etc., as given in Figure. 7.
These services are provided to the individual users in a
distributed manner instead of a centralized manner [82]. This
saves time and costs that otherwise incurs on purchasing
expensive and powerful resources. Thus, it not only reduce
cost but also improve reliability as opposed to the centralized
approach [99], [100]. The user usually pays per use fees for
accessing and using these resources to the vendor. Few of the
common security attacks on the IaaS are presented below.
1) stepping stone
2) virtual machine escape
3) side channel attacks
4) malicious insiders
5) programming attacks
6) VM rollback attacks
7) cross VM attacks
8) virtual cloud protection
9) session hijacking






In this type of attack, the attacker usually hides their identity
using various techniques. They usually attack using a series of
stepping stones. It is very difficult to trace back the identity
of the attacker because they hide their actual identity while
using a fake identity instead.
b: VIRTUAL MACHINE ESCAPE
This is another common attack that occurs on the IaaS,
particularly targeting virtual machines. During this attack,
the attacker launches an attack by forcing the victim OS
hosted on the VM to communicate directly with the hypervi-
sors. The hypervisors are the virtual machine monitors. As a
result, the attackers get full access to all virtual machines and
the OS hosting those virtual machines [63], [86], [101].
c: SIDE CHANNEL ATTACKS
In these kinds of attacks, the intruder get information from
the implementation of the system, at the design level. They
exploit the loophole in the network and access to informa-
tion such as power consumption, electromagnetic leaks, and
sound leak that provide additional knowledge to the attackers
for launching other attacks.
d: MALICIOUS INSIDERS
Malicious insider attacks occur when an insider exhausts the
system’s storage and processing capabilities beyond its limit.
The effect of such an attack ranges from moderate to catas-
trophic, where the system is unable to respond and finally
crashes. These types of attacks may significantly degrade the
performance of the applications.
e: VIRTUAL MACHINE (VM) ROLLBACK ATTACKS
In a VM roll-back attack, a compromised hypervisor executes
a virtual machine from an older snapshot without the knowl-
edge of the user. A user is usually an entity that uses the cloud
services and is the owner of one of theVMs [63]. During these
attacks, the attacker ignores some security checks or undo
few of the security-critical updates. For instance, a perpetrator
may launch a brute-force attack to guess the password for
login to the VM. Despite restrictions imposed by the OS,
such as blocking for a while after three failed attempts or
erasing all data after a limited number of times. The attack-
ers can bypass any type of such restrictions infinitely by
roll-backing the VM to its initial state. Moreover, the attacker
can also roll-back the permission control module to undo
the user permission change to expose users’ later informa-
tion to those who should be blocked. The roll-back attacks
are different from the reply attacks because, in the reply
attacks, an attacker repeatedly sends the previous messages
to the VM. However, in roll-back attacks, the VM itself is
replied [102]. Apart from these, VM migrations can also be
attached as described in [86].
f: CROSS VIRTUAL MACHINE (VM) ATTACKS
The cloud architecture facilitates its customers by providing
them with virtual machines (VM) that enable them to scale
their resources on-demand. Moreover, it provides logical iso-
lation between the VMs that separate one VM from the other
VM. This implies that these are logically individual VMs, but
they share the physical server and resources. The attackers
usually target such a multi-tenant virtual environment with
cross-VM attacks. The attackers use a single VM to target
other VMs on the same hypervisor by redirecting their net-
work traffic, controlling them, or accessing them. Moreover,
the attackers mainly target the cache memory. They also
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target the CPU, memory, I/O devices, as well as the cloud
network [19], [20], [63].
g: SESSION HIJACKING
A session refers to all information concerned with an ongoing
transaction. The information related to the session is gener-
ally stored in a server along with a unique ID. The unique ID
is usually a random number with the starting time and date of
the session. The session ID is shared with the customers with
their first request and is presented back to the server with each
subsequent request. This allows the server to access the stored
data appropriate to that specific session, making a logical
relationship between the current and previous transactions.
In cloud computing, session hijacking is a common security
issue. During these attacks, the adversary gains unautho-
rized access to information required for session establishment
stored at the cookies. Once the attacker gain access to such
information, it empowers them to do everything that a legit-
imate user can do in the network, compromising its security,
privacy, and integrity.
h: DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS (DDoS)
ATTACKS
In a DDoS attack, the attackers aim to disrupt the normal
operation of the network by denying access to the available
resources and the network. Some of these resources include
web servers, CPU, bandwidth, and memory. Cloud architec-
ture can adversely affect various cloud services offered by the
virtual servers by damaging them. It degrades their quality or
sometimes fully breakdown the network connectivity as well
as consumes its bandwidth. The attackers usually deploy a
large number of agents or bots to launch DDoS attacks. These
attackers usually target a bug/flaw or known vulnerabilities
in Software to launch such attacks. They usually scan the
network to find machines with vulnerabilities that act as
agents by the attackers, also known as zombies. The primary
purpose of the attacker is to disrupt the normal operation of
the network by making it so busy that the legitimate users are
denied access to those resources [103].
i: THEFT-OF-SERVICE ATTACKS
In a Theft-of-Service attack, a malicious virtual machine mis-
behaves in such a manner that the VM hacks the hypervisor,
which assigns additional resources than the resource capacity
it is supposed to obtain. This additional resource provisioning
for the malicious virtual machine comes at the cost of the
other VMs co-located on the same server. Therefore, other
co-located VMs are assigned fewer resources than what they
pay for, which subsequently degrades their performance and
increases their monetary costs [63], [82].
V. COUNTERMEASURES AND CONTROLS
Securing the sensor-cloud architecture is a complex task.
Because it is the holistic combination of policies, technology,
and the people, they must be managed altogether to design
a secure system. Few of the possible solutions to secure this
architecture against various security threats and attacks are as
follows.
A. END-TO-END ENCRYPTION
The prime benefit of the sensor-cloud is that it shifts various
resources intensive tasks such as processing and storage from
centralized to the distributed architecture. Although this shift
of tasks has many advantages on the one hand; but, it also
gives rise to many security threats on the other hand. It is
highly desirable to apply end-to-end encryption on the data
due to the passage of such data from various geographical
locations and servers to servers.
B. SCANNING FOR MALICIOUS ACTIVITIES
Despite that, end-to-end encryption is highly effective for
securing data against malicious activities. However, it intro-
duces new risks. One such risk is that encrypted data is
unreadable by the firewall and intrusion detection system.
Thus, novel countermeasure and preventive measures should
be devised that differentiate the real encrypted data from that
of the malicious data once it reaches these points, i.e., IDS
and firewalls.
C. VALIDATION OF CLOUD CONSUMER
Cloud facilitates the users by shifting few of the
resources-intensive tasks from the resources-constrained
platform to the resources-rich platform (sensor to fog, sensor
to remote cloud, fog to cloud). However, one of the chal-
lenging issues in these environments is the authentication
of genuine and legitimate users from intruders and hackers.
In this way, the cloud architecture is protected against various
malicious activities by attackers.
D. SECURE INTERFACES AND APIs
APIs and interfaces are important components of cloud archi-
tecture. They offer automation, orchestration, and manage-
ment. It is imperative to detect, control, and mitigate security
issues by tracking malicious interfaces and APIs [63]. Man-
agement level security threats are further described in [86].
E. INSIDER ATTACKS
Security attacks from the insiders are the most common type
of attacks that target the sensor-cloud architecture [63], [73],
[86]. These insiders may be either permanent or contrac-
tual employees working for an organization. Furthermore,
former employees who have left the company also pose a
serious security threat due to their in-depth knowledge of
the business process and various network components. They
can negatively affect the security and privacy aspects of
the information system. Few of the possible reasons that an
employee becomes a malicious insider are because of their
revenge, coercion, ideology, ego, or seeking financial gain
through intellectual property theft or espionage. Insiders are
difficult to trace due to their double role. These attackers
work as an agent for the rival organizations for financial
gains. It is a must that the cloud vendors take precautionary
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measures by authenticating users and strengthening inter-
nal security systems to prevent their organization from such
attacks. Few of the possible solutions should be organization
policies, frequent role change, educating employees, and the
deletion of all accounts related to employees who have left an
organization.
F. SECURE LEVERAGED RESOURCES
All resources of the cloud are shared among multiple users
due to the multi-tenancy model. In such an environment, it is
necessary first to authenticate the users and then secure the
shared resources, i.e., hypervisor, orchestration, and monitor-
ing tools [81]. A detailed investigation of such attacks and
solutions is presented in [63].
G. BUSINESS CONTINUITY PLANS
It is necessary to keep a record of various security attacks
and breaches that happens in the past and respond of that
organization to such incidents. This is important because such
documents guide the organization if similar security breaches
occur shortly. Then, machine learning-based techniques can
be applied to the traced and recorded data to predict future
security threats/attacks and triggers appropriate avoidance
mechanisms.
VI. OPEN RESEARCH CHALLENGES
Cloud computing has revolutionized the way various comput-
ing resources are used, controlled, and managed [82]. How-
ever, this revolution and development face various issues and
challenges. One of such challenging issues is the security of
the sensor-cloud. Recently, researchers in the field have taken
serious steps to tackle this issue, but there exist several open
research issues that need to be addressed and discussed in
this section. The attackers targeting the resource-constrained
sensor nodes by forcing the node to process a large vol-
ume of malicious data exhausting both their energy and
resources. One of the possible solutions to stop such attacks
from occurring is to add header and control packets. More-
over, strong authentication schemes can negate the effects
of such attacks and protect them. However, the design of
such schemes is hindered by the following two issues. Firstly,
there is no lightweight, universally accepted encryption algo-
rithms supported by the common cryptographic libraries that
can be implemented at the hardware level of the embedded
devices.
The second issue is related to the additional overhead
incurs due to various supplementary information added
to the message for additional authentication requirements.
In the future, designers should aim for strong authentica-
tion schemes with minimum additional information requir-
ing reduced space and processing overhead. Another issue
is related to communication protocols in cloud architec-
ture with known vulnerabilities. The interfaces and APIs
are important because they facilitate automation, orches-
tration, and management. However, these protocols, stan-
dards, interfaces, and APIs can be manipulated for their
known vulnerabilities [63]. The attackers exploit and tar-
get these vulnerabilities and launch various attacks. These
loopholes act as the first step for the attackers to launch
various attacks on the whole architecture. For example, one
such example is SOAP messages that can be exploited to
target cloud platforms and steal confidential data and infor-
mation. It is necessary to address those vulnerabilities and
improve their security by incorporating strong encryption
mechanisms.
In sensor-cloud architecture, the data is distributed across
multiple geographical domains. It is necessary to encrypt
the data from the source to the destination. In this regard,
a lot of work focuses on symmetric solutions. However, such
solutions ignore the effect of capture node attacks. It would
be interesting to develop optimized and advanced cryptosys-
tems for this architecture in the future. We observed during
surveying the literature that IoT security lacks a collaborative
solution in which numerous domains (fog, cloud, and sensing
devices) communicate with each other to mitigate a certain
attack type. Besides, lightweight cryptography, lightweight
network security protocols, and digital forensics are more
attractive research fields in the sensor-cloud security archi-
tectures [63].
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we focus our discussion on one of the impor-
tant and challenging issues of security in the sensor-cloud
architecture. A state-of-the-art taxonomy of security attacks
on the sensors-cloud is also presented. These security attacks
are categorized based on the sensor-cloud’s architectural per-
spective targeting various components of this architecture and
securing them from security attacks. These components are
sensors, cloud architecture, and the channel that facilitate
communication between the two entities. Moreover, limita-
tions of the previous surveys as well as the contributions
of this survey are also provided. Furthermore, in this paper,
limitations and possible future directions are also provided to
the readers for future work and possible extensions so as to
make sensor-cloud more resilient, reliable, and secure against
various attacks in the years ahead.
We expect that security and privacy shall be accounted for
at the preliminary design stage of the IoT systems to evade
the common drawback of seeing security as an afterthought.
Though pursuing the position of intelligent objects is consid-
ered a concealment violation; however, it may also have some
beneficial cases, i.e., security agencies depend on chasing
the smart objects carried by a missing person to identify the
location of the missing person. Such kinds of digital forensics
in the IoT era will play an important role and is expected to
receive further attention in the future [63]. Moreover, the fog
domain is supposed to bring the computational capabilities to
the network’s edge. In the future, we will pay further attention
to this domain as it has not received enough attention from
academia and the industry.
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